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ABSTRACT 
 
MODELING THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF  
BANKING SECTOR REGULATION AND SUPERVISION  
 
Şenel, Gonca 
Master of Economics 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Bilin Neyaptı 
 
August 2007 
 
In this thesis, the effect of bank regulation and supervision on economic growth 
is analyzed theoretically. By means of OLG model framework, optimization problems of 
three types of agents have been constructed: consumer’s utility maximization problem, 
producer’s and bank’s profit maximization problems. Two types of settings have been 
evaluated separately in order to figure out the monitoring decisions of the bank: 
homogenous producers and non-homogenous producers. Regulation and supervision 
level of the banking sector is represented by an index, which is denoted by α in the 
model and it affects the optimization behavior of each agent: it increases the amount of 
deposits transferred to banks by consumers; it enhances the amount of credit that is 
converted into capital, and it affects behaviors of the bank in terms of monitoring 
producers. Calibration analysis is performed and it is found that no monitoring is more 
preferable for the bank as compared to monitoring and variable cost monitoring is more 
preferable than fixed cost monitoring. In addition, comparative static analysis yield that 
 iii
  
higher bank regulation and supervision improves per capita output, wages and credit and 
reduces interest rates and  producers with higher credit conversion capabilities have 
higher per capita output; they pay higher wages; they demand more credit and pay less 
interest rate. 
 
Keywords: Regulation and Supervision of Banking Sector, Economic Growth                                        
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ÖZET 
 
BANKACILIK SEKTÖRÜ DENETLEME VE GÖZETİMİNİN EKONOMİK 
ETKİLERİNİN MODELLENMESİ 
 
Şenel, Gonca 
Yüksek Lisans, İktisat Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı:  Doç. Dr. Bilin Neyaptı 
 
Ağustos 2007 
 
Bu tezde, banka denetleme ve gözetiminin ekonomik gelişmeye olan etkisi teorik 
olarak incelenmiştir. Çakışan Nesiller modeli çerçevesinde üç çeşit bireyin eniyileme 
problemleri kurulmuştur: tüketicinin yarar eniyileme problemi, üreticinin ve bankanın 
kar eniyileme problemi. Bankanın denetleme kararlarını çözebilmek amacıyla iki durum 
birbirinden ayrı olarak değerlendirilmiştir: türdeş üreticiler ve türdeş olmayan üreticiler. 
Modelde α  ile ifade edilen bankacılık sektörü denetleme ve düzenleme derecesi bir 
endeksle gösterilmektedir ve her bireyin eniyileme davranışlarını etkilemektedir: 
tüketicilerin bankalara yatırdıkları tüketicilerin mevduat miktarını arttırır,  sermayeye 
dönüşen kredi miktarını yükseltir ve bankanın üreticileri denetleme davranışlarını 
etkiler. Kalibrasyon analizleri yapılmış ve bankalar için üreticileri denetlememek 
denetlemeye nazaran ; değişken maliyetli denetleme de sabit maliyetli denetlemeye 
nazaran daha tercih edilir bulunmuştur. Bununla birlikte, karşılaştırmalı statik analizleri 
yapılmış ve bu analizler daha yüksek seviyede bankacılık denetleme ve düzenlemesinin 
 v
  
daha yüksek kişi başına gelir, ücret ve kredi sağladığını; faiz miktarlarını düşürdüğünü; 
aynı zamanda daha yüksek kredi dönüştürme becerisine sahip olan üreticilerin daha 
yüksek ücret ödediğini, daha fazla kredi talep ettiğini ve daha düşük faiz ödediğini 
ortaya koymuştur.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Bankacılık Denetleme ve Düzenlemesi, Ekonomik Büyüme      
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Importance of financial intermediaries on economic activities has long been 
known by economists. Beginning with Schumpeter (1912), it has been realized that 
financial intermediaries foster economic growth by facilitating investment. When there 
are costs involved in economic transactions between individuals, financial 
intermediaries handle these costs better than individuals since they can pool risk and 
control borrowers by monitoring. They benefit from economies of scale so that they are 
able to allocate the resources efficiently.    
 
Considering the relationship between financial development and economic 
growth, there is a vast amount of work showing the importance of financial 
intermediaries on economic growth, and most of them show strongly that financial 
sector development is an important aspect on promoting growth. Greenwood and 
Jovanovic (1990) and Benchivenga and Smith (1991) show the existence of this 
 1
  
relationship theoretically by using endogenous growth models. Besides the theoretical 
work, many studies (for example, King and Levine (1993), and Levine (1997)) 
empirically show that there is robust and significant relationship between financial 
system development and economic growth.  
 
In addition to the analysis of the financial sector development and growth 
relationship, economists also focus on the effect of the banking sector on the economy 
specifically. These studies reveal that by allocating resources to the most “appropriate 
candidates” by managing risk and monitoring borrowers, banks increase the efficient use 
of resources leading to economic growth. On this aspect, Townsend (1979) and Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981) construct the theoretical background of banking theory.  
 
Considering banks’ decision process we can say that banks are among the most 
influential agents in the economy who verify “appropriateness” of candidates that help 
transform savings into investment. Therefore, well functioning of banks is very 
important for economic growth, and regulation and supervision (RS) of banks is an 
important concern for banks to sustain their performance by controlling investment 
decisions in terms of risk and effectiveness.       
 
This is the first study that examines RS and growth relationship theoretically and 
it is motivated mainly by Neyaptı and Dinçer (ND, 2005), who measure countries’ 
regulation and supervision (RS) based on the letter of banking laws. From these 
measurements, ND construct country-specific RS indices that they use to test the 
relationship between RS and growth. The test results show that there is a positive and 
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robust relationship between RS level and economic growth in transition economies. 
Barth et al. (2004) also measure RS, using a different methodology and based on 
questionnaires, finding positive association between RS and bank stability and 
performance. 
 
In our study, we aim to investigate the existence of this relationship using a 
model-based approach. We use the 2-period OLG model setting with three types of 
agents: consumers, producers and banks, where banks are the only source of the credit. 
The economy has a predetermined RS level ( )α  that is in the same spirit as the country-
specific RS index of ND1.  The model is set such that the α  level affects all types of the 
agents from different aspects: it increases the portion of savings that are put in to the 
banks as deposits, it increases the portion of the credit that is converted into capital, and 
it affects (positively) the decision of the bank to monitor borrowers. We also consider 
two different settings, where producers are homogenous and non-homogenous in terms 
of their credit conversion capabilities so that we are able to examine the effect of 
individual moral hazard rates and RS on the economy. 
 
The findings of our study indicate that RS positively affects the economy; it 
increases the production, per capita capital and wages at the same time. In addition, we 
also investigate the effect of RS on bank decision process and find that different RS 
levels change the tendency of banks to monitor the agents. 
 
                                                 
1 RS in ND is formed based on the “intensity” of various aspects of legal provisions, including capital 
requirements, lending, ownership structure, directors and managers, reporting/recording requirements, 
corrective action, supervision and deposit insurance.    
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The organization of the remainder study is as follows: In Chapter 2, we examine 
the literature on the relationship between financial sector development and economic 
growth; in Chapter 3, we propose a model to analyze the effect of RS on the economy; 
in Chapter 4, we interpret our results emerging from the model solution; and Chapter 5 
concludes and outlines the extensions that will be undertaken. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
In Arrow-Debreu world, information is symmetric and frictionless in terms of 
information flow and markets are complete.  In this setting, there is no need for financial 
intermediation since the agents can obtain information and do the transactions by 
themselves without incurring any cost (Levine, 1997 and Santos, 2001). However, in the 
actual world, these activities carry costs that the individuals cannot bear alone. This 
situation leads to the formation of financial intermediaries in order to carry out the 
transactions. 
 
The main goal of a financial intermediary is to reallocate the resources of 
economic units with surplus (savers) to economic units with funding needs (borrowers) 
(see Allen and Santomero, 2001). According to Levine (1997), the functions of financial 
intermediaries are allocating the resources, mobilizing savings, managing risk and 
ensuring corporate control by monitoring.  Similarly, in Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) 
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the roles of financial intermediaries are summarized as:  reducing the costs of 
transactions, benefiting from economies of scale by increase in size, increasing the 
quality and level of investment, giving signals about the quality of the borrower.  From 
these definitions it can be realized that financial intermediaries play an important role in 
overcoming the information and transaction costs. Accordingly, it can be claimed that 
these institutions affect the system and lead to economic growth by improving resource 
allocation decisions and investment quality. On this matter, the finance-growth literature 
offers three different views (see Levine, 2003 and 1997).  
 
According to the first view, in the essays of Meier and Seers (1984), authors do 
not even mention the financial system as one of the explanatory variables leading to 
economical growth since they think that it is not worth to do so (see Levine 2003).  In 
addition to this, Lucas (1988) also claims that role of the financial sector on growth is 
overemphasized.  
 
The second view, pioneered by Robinson (1952), claims that finance follows 
growth rather than the reverse relation. She claims that development in economy creates 
a need for the development in financial sector that in return leads to economic growth.  
 
The third perception has roots at the beginning of the 20th century; Schumpeter 
(1911) emphasizes the importance of development of financial system on economic 
growth (see Levine, 1997). Schumpeter claims that financial system fosters economic 
growth by promoting technological innovation. Financial intermediaries are able to 
identify and fund successful innovative products and processes that in return lead to 
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growth in the economy.  They are better suited for these functions than individuals due 
to economies of scale that lowers transaction and information costs.  
 
Early theoretical research on finance and growth relation can be listed as Patrick 
(1966), Cameron (1967), Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), and Shaw (1973). With 
the emergence of endogenous growth literature, which is pioneered by Romer (1986 and 
1990), Lucas (1988) and Rebelo (1991), these models started to be extensively used in 
explaining the relationship between financial development and economic growth in 
general equilibrium models. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) present the first 
theoretical work that attempts to explain the finance-growth relationship by using the 
endogenous growth theory. In their work, they aim to explain two important issues 
related with growth, finance and income distributions. Firstly, they find support for 
Kuznets’s (1955) hypothesis on growth and income distribution. In this theory, 
difference in income levels widens as the economy experiences a fast-growth and then 
this difference vanishes as the economy becomes stable. Secondly, they theoretically 
show these stages and differences. By means of endogenous growth theory, they also 
claim that there is an interrelation between finance and growth rather than a one 
direction causal relationship. They show that economic growth helps agents use costly 
financial structures, what we can call as financial development, and, as a response, 
financial development fosters growth. As a further study, Townsend and Ueda (2005) 
take this model as base and explore economies in transition with further calibration.  
 
Benchivenga and Smith (1991) show financial structure-growth relationship in a 
different setting, again using endogenous growth models. Different from Greenwood 
 7
  
and Jovanovic (1990), they use overlapping generations’ model and focus on the effect 
of competitive financial intermediaries on savings behavior. Upon the examination of 
findings, they report that relationship between financial intermediation and savings 
behavior is not clear. However, by using this model, they also reach the conclusion that 
financial intermediation increases economic growth level.  
 
In these two previous models, financial intermediaries achieve economic growth 
by allocating resources to investments that have high return. Considering characteristics 
of financial intermediaries we can say that in both of the models, financial 
intermediation was restricted to banks. Building upon the previous two theoretical 
models, Greenwood and Smith (1997) develop two models in order to investigate 
finance-growth relationship. First one is constructed in order to explore the role of a 
financial intermediary in efficient allocation of funds by ensuring liquidity in the market. 
This is the improved version of previous Bencivenga-Smith (1991) model. In this 
version, authors report that “intermediation is necessarily growth enhancing” (p.4). In 
addition, endogenous formation of equity markets is introduced in the model. In this 
study, researchers determine the conditions under which both intermediation takes place 
and equity market is formed. The second model aims at exploring the effect of financial 
intermediation on specialization. From these two models what they find is that there is a 
“threshold effect” (similar to Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990), implying that an 
economy should be wealthy enough to support financial structure, which then fosters 
economic growth in turn. 
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In another recent study, Khan (2001) is mainly concerned with costs emerging 
from informational asymmetries. He develops a dynamic equilibrium model in which 
agents, who have access to external finance, obtain higher returns to investment. This 
leads other agents to adopt to the current level of technology. Accordingly, he proposes 
that financial intermediation increases overall net worth of investment. 
 
Studies summarized above are only interested in growth and its interaction with 
financial intermediation. In addition to these models, Aghion et al. (2005) explore the 
effects of financial development on cyclical component of investment and accordingly to 
growth and volatility under the assumption of tight credit constraints. In this study they 
form a growth model in which firms have two investment options: long-term and short-
term investment. With the help of this model, they find that low financial development 
causes high sensitivity of growth to exogenous shocks and stronger negative effect of 
volatility on growth.   
 
Considering models aiming at explaining banking theory alone, we observe that 
Townsend (1979) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) are the major papers that construct 
banking theory by using utility and profit maximization. In their models, asymmetric 
information plays an important role in resource allocation process (Guzman, 2000). 
Sharp (1990) considers banking and borrower relationships in a endogenous model. 
Bernanke et al. (1998) explores the effects of credit frictions on business fluctuations. 
They examine whether “financial accelerator” increases the effect of the shock in the 
economy by investment channels and find that there is a positive relationship between 
financial accelerator and business cycle behaviors.  
 9
  
  
The foregoing studies summarize the main models that examine the importance 
of financial markets with respect to optimal resource allocation and overcoming 
information costs.  As we look at the empirical evidence, we also see that there is strong 
support for financial intermediaries’ role to amplify growth.  As one of the most 
influential empirical studies King  and Levine (1993) explore whether there is a 
relationship between financial development (defined as four distinct variables) and 
economic growth (defined as three different variables). They use cross-country analysis 
and find out that four indicators of financial development ( size of formal financial 
intermediation sector relative to GDP; importance of banks relative to the central bank; 
percentage of credit allocated to private firms; and ratio of credit issued to private firms 
to GDP) are strongly and robustly correlated with the indicators of economic growth 
(which are per capita GDP growth; rate of physical capital accumulation; and 
improvements in the efficiency of capital allocation). In addition, they test whether 
financial development indicators are successful in predicting long run growth. In this 
study they find that predetermined component of financial development is a good 
predictor of long-run growth.   
  
King and Levine’s study is successful in explaining the relationship between 
financial market development and growth, but there is still room for doubt for the 
direction of causality. Following this study, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) support the 
same idea and examine the direction of the causal relationship using a different set of 
indicators and US data. Using bank branch deregulation as the indicator of financial 
development, they find evidence that states do not deregulate their financial system 
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when they have an expectation of higher growth. This finding indicates that growth does 
not lead to financial development.  In addition, they find that there is significant 
relationship between financial development and growth. Accordingly, they conclude that 
financial development promotes economic growth rather than the reverse relation.  
 
The causal relationship between financial development and economic growth is 
also investigated in Beck et al. (2000). In order to overcome the simultaneity problem, 
an exogenous determinant of financial development that also has no relationship with 
economic growth is used as an instrumental variable. Exogenous variable is determined 
as legal and accounting systems, following LaPorta et al. (1997 and 1998).  These 
variables are shown to be good indicators of financial development and accordingly they 
are used in growth regression. Result of the regressions shows that there is a robust and 
significant relationship between growth and exogenous indicators of financial 
development implying that financial development fosters economic growth. 
   
Beside above studies examining the relationship between financial development 
and growth has been shown empirically there is also a literature empirically 
demonstrating the individual importance of bank development on growth.  Levine 
(1998) examines the relationship between legal system, bank development and long run 
economic growth. In this study, firstly relationship between legal environment and bank 
development is examined and secondly by using legal environment factor as the 
exogenous determinant of bank development, relationship between bank development 
and long run growth has been explored. The legal system information is obtained from 
LaPorta et al. (1997 and 1998). Levine (1998) finds that legal rights of creditors and 
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effectiveness of the enforcement of these rights are among the most important indicators 
of the bank-development. In addition to this, they find that exogenous component of 
bank development is positively correlated with long run growth. 
  
In most of the previous studies the effect of banking sector development was 
used in order to show the finance-growth relationship. Arestis and Demetriades (1997) 
investigate whether the same relationship holds as financial development is represented 
by stock market development. In addition to this, they prefer to use time series approach 
rather than cross-section analysis in order to control for the country-specific effects. In 
this setting, they find a similar relationship but the results mostly depend on individual 
countries. 
  
After investigating these studies, which specifically focus on either banking or 
stock market development, Levine and Zervos (1998) study the effect of banking sector 
development and stock market development together and test whether their individual 
relationship with growth is still significant and robust even though they are tested 
together. In this study, they find out that stock market liquidity and banking 
development are both positively and robustly correlated with future rates of economic 
growth. In addition, since banking development and stock market liquidity enter into the 
same growth regression and they are both significant, it is claimed that banks provide 
different financial services than stock markets. Beck and Levine (2002) provide another 
study that considers joint effect of banking sector and stock market development by 
using dynamic panel technique. They also conclude that both stock markets and banks 
have positive and significant effect on economic growth. Using new panel techniques, 
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they also overcome the critiques about omitted variable, country specific and 
simultaneity problems.  
 
 Apart from these studies, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) explore 
individual characteristics of financial systems and their effect on easiness of raising 
external finance for growth. They find out that “securities markets and banking system 
affect firm’s ability to obtain financing in different ways especially at lower levels of 
financial development” (p.33).  In addition to this, they find that development of 
securities markets is related to long-term financing, whereas development of banking 
sector is related to the availability of short-term financing. Rajan and Zingales (1998) is 
another study showing that financial development reduces costs of external finance, 
which facilitates economic growth. Levine (2003) provides an in depth review of this 
literature.  
  
Previous studies appear to implicitly assume that financial development affects 
growth rates by improving the effectiveness of allocation of funds. Benhabib and 
Spiegel (2000) find that beside effective allocation of funds, financial development 
affects investment rates and total factor productivity. However, they also claim that this 
relationship depends heavily on which indicator of financial development is used. 
 
Beside studies that investigate the overall effect of financial development on 
growth, there is also a literature that compares the individual effects of stock market and 
banks on growth. Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) test the relationship between 
economic development and both banks and stock market relationship using new data and 
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new classification of countries.  Comparing  effects of these two kinds of financial 
intermediaries, they find out the determinants of financial structure; they report that the 
more efficient and richer the countries the larger, more active and more efficient banks 
and stock markets they have. In addition, they find that the higher the income levels, the 
more active and efficient are the stock markets as compared to the banks. They also find 
that countries with Common Law have stronger protection of shareholder rights, good 
accounting, and low levels of corruption as compared to the countries with French Law. 
Comparison of these markets continues in Levine (2002), where his empirical 
investigation yields no clear cut difference in two financial systems in terms of growth 
promotion. Chakraborty and Ray (2006) analyze differences between market-based and 
bank-based systems using endogenous growth models. Similarly, in their model they 
find that neither of models outperforms the other in terms of the promotion of growth. 
However, it is also underlined that banks have some advantages over market-based 
system. For example, it is stated that levels of investment and per capita GDP are higher 
under a bank-based system and bank monitoring resolves some of the agency problems.  
 
 In order to figure out whether the bank structure also matters for economic 
growth, Guzman (2000) compares equilibrium growth paths of two different bank 
structures: monopolistic and competitive banking systems. As a result, it is found out 
that monopoly banking structure has an adverse effect on capital accumulation because 
of the availability of credit rationing. In addition, there are empirical studies examining 
banking structure and its relationship with capital accumulation and, accordingly, 
growth. Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) find that there is a negative effect of bank 
concentration (individual market power of each bank) on growth. Contrarily, they also 
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find that bank concentration has a positive relationship with the growth of sectors in 
which young firms that need external credit exist. In addition, Guzman (2000) reviews 
bank market structure literature in detail.  
 
Beside the structure, regulation and supervision of banking sector has attracted 
attention because of its policy implications. Barth et al. (2001) empirically examine the 
relationship between restrictive regulations on activities of banks and (i) weak 
government/bureaucratic systems (ii) poor functioning of banking systems and (iii) 
possibility of banking crises.   In this study they  do not observe a significant 
relationship between restrictive regulatory systems and poorly functioning banking 
systems and they report that restrictive regulatory systems do not guarantee a low 
probability of a banking crisis. Additionally, Barth et al. (2004 and 2005) claim that 
rather than restrictive practices on banks, policies increasing private sector corporate 
control promote bank development performance and stability. This idea is also 
supported in Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2003). 
  
Although these papers explore the relationship between bank regulation and 
supervision and economic performance the way they define the banking sector 
regulation and supervision levels are subject to criticism since they may suffer from 
biases that surveys are generally prone to. Neyaptı and Dinçer (2005) approach to this 
issue differently, by measuring regulation and supervision based on the letter of banking 
laws, a methodology which avoids potential biases in surveys. Besides measuring the 
quality of bank regulation and supervision,  the evaluation criteria the authors provide 
help to construct indices so that they can be used in empirical studies. Using these 
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indices, Neyapti and Dincer (2005) test the existence of this relationship in transition 
economies and find that there is a positive and significant relationship between 
regulation and supervision and economic growth rates.    
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CHAPTER III  
 
THE MODEL AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
In order the show the relationship between bank regulation and supervision (RS) 
and economic growth, this model utilizes a 2-period OLG model. In this framework, 
there are three kinds of agents in the economy: consumers, producers and many banks, 
which are identical to each other.2 The extent or intensity of RS, measured by α , refers 
to the restrictiveness/extent of coverage and transparency in legal provisions as indicated 
in Neyaptı and Dinçer (2005). This measure ranges between 0 and 1, 0 indicating no 
regulation and supervision in the economy and 1 indicating full RS.   
 
Consumers live for two periods, young in the first period, and old in the second 
period. They have inelastic supply of labor and only work in the first period. They 
allocate their income considering the two periods (no altruism is present), and save some 
of their income for the second period consumption. They do not have any additional 
                                                 
2 Accordingly we will do our analysis based on one representative bank. 
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income for the second period. Within this construction, savings are determined by 
maximizing utility. After the determination of savings, consumers put a portion of 
savings (which is a positive function of α  and denoted by ( )f α ) into the bank and keep 
the remaining (1 ( ))f α−  portion. 3  Hence, the higher the RS ( )α , the greater the trust 
in the financial sector, or the bank in this set up, and more of the savings can therefore 
be put in the banks in the form of deposits, which can then be lent out as credit.  
 
Producers have a Cobb Douglas type production function. We assume that the 
rate of depreciation of capital from one period to the next one is %100.4 In addition to 
these, throughout this paper, we will have two different assumptions for producers. In 
the first part of the study (Section III.3.1), producers are assumed to be homogenous. In 
this setting, the only factor that affects the behavior of credit use is the level of α , such 
that only the α  portion of what they have borrowed can be converted into capital and 
used in production; and the remaining (1 )α−  portion will simply be considered as a part 
of the consumption5. In the second part (Section III.3.2), producers are differentiated 
from each other with respect to their credit conversion capabilities: . Hence, individual 
 levels and 
ip
ip α   together demonstrate how much of the credit will be turned into 
capital.  
 
                                                 
3 In model construction, we assume ( )f α α= . 
4 It is a custom to assume that one period of OLG model lasts for thirty years , which then justifies %100 
depreciation for capital. 
5 The model doesn’t distinguish between producer and consumer, they can therefore be assumed to be the 
same agents. 
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Bank collects deposits from consumers and gives these deposits to producers as 
credit. Facing the credit demand and deposit supply, the bank determines both deposit 
and credit interest rates. When producers are homogenous, bank enforces a unique 
interest rate to each producer. When producers are heterogeneous, there are two options 
for the bank: it will either monitor the producers by incurring a cost and impose 
individualized interest rates (Section III.3.2.1); or not monitor the producers and impose 
the same interest rate and extend the same amount of credit to each producer (Section 
III.3.2.2).  
 
Using the above described framework, we will thus assess the effect of bank RS 
(α ) in promoting growth.  
 
The parameter α  factors in the model in two different ways: 
i) When RS increases, indicating prudential management of funds 
by the banks, depositors believe that their funds will be put in 
good uses and they will be able to retrieve their funds upon 
demand.  
ii) When RS is high, producers will be better monitored and thus 
both adverse selection and moral hazard problems will be 
avoided.  
 
In section III.1 and III.2 we will report the model description and timing of 
events respectively. In III.3 we will solve the model considering two cases: 
Homogenous Producers and Non-Homogenous Producers.  In Section III.4 different 
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settings will be analyzed on the basis of bank profit function and, in subsections; profits 
will be examined with respect to three different cost alternatives: variable monitoring 
costs; fixed monitoring costs; and no monitoring. Section III.5 concludes this chapter by 
exploring the monitoring decision of the bank.  
 
III.1. Variables and Description of the Model 
 
In our model bank regulation and supervision level, denoted by α , affects the 
behaviors of banks, consumers and producers in different aspects: 
 
i) From consumers’ viewpoint, α  demonstrates their trust level to the 
banking sector. They put α  portion of their savings (rather than putting 
all of their savings) to the bank and keep (1 )α−  portion of the savings 
with them. These consumers do not have investment alternatives such 
that the remaining (1 )α−  portion of their savings are kept and do not 
earn any interest. According to this setting, it can be claimed that the 
amount of savings that are transferred to the banks increases as the level 
of RS increases. 
 
ii) From producers viewpoint, α  indicates the proportion of credit that is 
converted into capital (that is, K CRα= ). In other words, it demonstrates 
the level of credit that is put into the production. When the α  level 
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increases, the level of capital that is used in the production process also 
increases. 
 
iii) From bank’s viewpoint, α  parameter plays two roles in the decision 
process. Firstly, α  determines the level of credit that will be repaid by 
the producers. In other words, if a producer borrows  amount of credit 
from the bank, this producer will pay back 
CR
α  portion of this credit 
together with the interest rate. Secondly, α  level affects the cost of 
monitoring. When α  increases, the cost of monitoring producers 
decreases. 
 
In the following, we will refer to time periods when young and old as t-1 and t, 
respectively. In consumer’s problem, t 1s −  denotes the amount of savings of each 
consumer, which is determined according to intertemporal consumption-saving 
allocation decisions of consumers, and   is the amount of consumption, such that t-1c
(1 )t- t- t- t-s c w crα1 1 1+ ≤ + − 1  must hold for each consumer in order  to sustain the budget 
constraint6.  is the amount of deposits, which is t -1d α  portion of savings ( t-1 t-1d sα= ) 
that are transferred to banks in return for (1 )dtr+ , which is the interest rate paid by bank 
to each consumer in the next period. The remaining (1 )α−  portion of savings is kept by 
consumers.  
 
                                                 
6 Besides wages, consumers get the profit from unused credit coming from the producer’s 
problem. 
(1 )crα−
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In producer’s problem,  denotes real output that follows a Cobb-Douglas 
process, 
tY
tK  is capital and  is labor. tL tK  is determined according to the process: 
t t-1 t-1 tK K K dKδ= − +  where δ  denotes the depreciation rate. We assume depreciation 
rate (δ ) to be %100 and hence, t t tK dK I= = . When producers are homogenous, 
investment is tCRα  and thus t tK CRα= .  The remaining of the , tCR (1 ) tCRα− , will be 
directly transferred to the consumer. Interest rate on credit is denoted by . When 
producers are heterogeneous, 
(1 )tr+
it i itK p CRα= , and the remaining (1 )ip CRitα−  will denote 
the investment of individual producer i. In this case, (1 )itr+  denotes the individualized 
interest rate that is determined by the bank when it individually monitors the individuals. 
 
III.2. Timing of Events 
 
Young generation of time t-1 works in the production process , and gets its 
wages ; consuming part of which 
1( tY − )
) )1( tw − 1( tc − and saving the rest . They put 1( ts − ) α  of 
what they have saved in the bank and keep (1 )α−  of the savings with them. Hence, the 
young generation determines the supply of deposits which will be used at time t .  1( )tD −
 
Producers determine their demand for the credit at time t-1 ( and labor ( , 
which will be used for the production of time t . Production takes place at time t 
using the credit that is provided at time t-1, and labor that is obtained from the young 
generation of time t. At the end of the period, producers pay a “portion” of the interest 
)tCR )tL
( )tY
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rate, which is (1 )rα + in case of homogenous producers and (1 )i itp rα +  for non-
homogenous. At time t young generation of time t-1 gets old and becomes unable to 
supply labor. The old get the interest rate (1 )dtr+ ,  and consumes this entire 
amount ( ) . 1(1 )dt tr D −+
 
At time t-1, banks determine the interest rate (1 )dtr+  , which will be paid to 
consumers at time t, and (1 )itr+ , which will be obtained from producers in period t. 
Accordingly, they determine the level of credit that will be given to producers, which 
then be put into production in period t. At time t, banks get the interest  for the 
credit extended to the producers at time t-1 and pay (1
(1 )itr+
)dtr+  to the consumers who have 
supplied the deposits. These events can also be seen from Table 1. 
At time t-1: 
 
Table 1: Timing of Events 
 
Producers: 
• determine their demand for credit 
(CRt) and labor (Lt) 
 
Banks: 
• determine (1+rdt) and (1+rit) for 
time t 
• (CRt) is loaned to producers  
 
Consumers: 
• determine Dt-1=α St-1 and lend it to 
the banks 
At time t: 
Producers: 
• Yt is produced 
• Production profit (пt) is obtained 
• wt is paid to  the young of t 
• (1+rit)(1-αpi)CRt is given to the 
banks 
 
Banks: 
• pay Dt-1(1+rdt) 
• receive (1+rit)(1-αpi)CRt 
• πbank,t is obtained 
 
Consumers: 
• receive Dt-1(1+rdt) 
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III.3 Modeling Bank Regulation and Supervision  
 
This section considers consumers’ producers’ and banks’ problem in an OLG 
framework. In subsection III.3.1, we consider the case where all producers are identical 
and credit conversion ratio depends only onα ; and in III.3.2, all producers are 
heterogeneous, implying different moral hazard rates.   
 
III.3.1 Homogenous Producers 
 
Consumer’s Problem: 
 
Consumer maximizes its two period log utility function by choosing their two 
period consumption levels for a given time preference indicator, ρ . The consumer either 
saves (s) or consumes (c) its first period income, which is composed of wages (w) and 
profits from production 1tY − 7 ccordingly, the amount saved in the first period will also 
be obtained. 
. A
          
1
Maximize
tc −
1ln( ) ln( )
1t -1 t
c ρ+ + c  (1.1) 
 
    subject to (1 )t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1s c w crα+ ≤ + −  (1.2) 
where we define CRcr
L
= , which is defined as credit per labor. 
                                                 
7 Profit from production is essentially unused credit (1 )crα− as will be shown below in the producer’s 
problem. 
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Consumer deposits α  portion of its savings into the banks (that is, t 1 t-1d sα− = ), 
and receives the return of (1 )dtr+  in the next period. Hence, second period constraint is: 
 (1 ) (1 )t t-1 dtc s r st-1α α≤ + + −  (1.3) 
Inserting (1 )t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1s w cr cα= + − −  from equation(1.2), into inequality(1.3), and 
considering that equalities hold, we obtain 
( (1 ) )( (1 ) (1
tt t -1 t-1 t-1 d
c w cr c r ))α α α= + − − + + −  
 
when solved for (1 )t-1 t-1w crα+ − (income flow of consumers), this indicates: 
 (1 )
(1 ) (1 )
t
t
t -1 t-1 t-1
d
cw cr c
r
α α α+ − = + + + −  (1.4) 
 
The Lagrangian of this optimization problem using the objective function (1.1) 
and the above constraint (1.4) is: 
 
1ln( ) ln( ) ( (1 ) ( ))
1 (1
t
t -1 t t -1 t-1 t
dt
cL c c w cr c
r
λ αρ= + + + − − ++ ) (1 )α α+ + −  (1.5) 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. The first order conditions (FOC) yield: 
 1
t -1c
λ=  (1.6) 
and  
 1 1 1
1 (1 ) (1t dtc r
λ
)ρ α α
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ = ⎜⎜ ⎟+ + +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎟−
 (1.7) 
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whose solution together yields: 
  1 1 1 1
1 (1 ) (1t t-1 dtc c r )ρ α α
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ = ⎜⎜ ⎟+ + +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎟−
 (1.8) 
or: 
(1 ) (1 )
1
dt
t-1 t
rc cα αρ
⎛ ⎞+ + − =⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠  
When we use the equation (1.4) and write  in terms of  the solution looks like: tc t-1c
(1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )
1 (1 ) (1 )
t
dt
t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1
d
rc c w cr
r
α α αρ α α
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞+ + −+ =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ + + −⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
+ −  
 
and hence: 
2 (1 )
1t -1 t-1 t-1
c wρ αρ
⎛ ⎞+ = + −⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠ cr  
or: 
1( (1 ) )
2t -1 t-1 t-1
w cr ρα ρ
⎛ ⎞++ − =⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠ c
)r
 
Thus, the ratio of savings to the first period income of the consumer ( (1 )t-1 t-1w cα+ −  
is: 
1 11
2 (2
ρ
)ρ ρ
⎛ ⎞+− =⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠  
 
This implies that per consumer amount of deposits in the banks is: 
 1
1 ( (1 )
(2 )t t -1
d wα ρ− = + −+ )t -1crα  (1.9) 
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Hence, deposits will be affected by α , but not by ; since we have inelastic supply of 
deposits (with respect to ) and since  is a cost for the bank it  will pay 0 interest 
rate
dtr
dtr dtr
8.  
 
Producer’s Problem: 
 
Producers maximize their profit ( prod∏ ) by choosing the optimal level of credit 
(CR) that will be borrowed from the bank, and the amount of labor that will be obtained 
from the consumers. In this setting, we assume that producers are homogenous in that 
they face the same level of credit interest, which is (1 )r+ . Also, in this case, we assume 
that . The producer transfers to the consumer the 1ip = (1 )ipα−  amount of credit that is 
not used in the production process because of imperfections in the regulation and 
supervision process (See equation(1.2)).   
 
Accordingly, the general profit function of the producer will be: 
 1 (1 )prod t t t tAK L wL K r
β β−∏ = − − +  (2.1) 
where A denotes technology, L denotes labor, w denotes wages and capital ( )tK follows 
the process : 
 t t-1 t-1 tK K K dKδ= − +  (2.2) 
Since we assumed that the depreciation rate ( )δ  is %100, we have: 
 t t tK dK I= =  (2.3) 
                                                 
8 This will be shown in bank’s problem 
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Considering the model features: 
 t t iK I p CRα= =  (2.4) 
 
Putting equation (2.4) in the production function in equation (2.1), we obtain: 
      Maximize
CR,L
1 (1 )prod i t t t t i tA p CR L w L p CR r
β β β βα α−∏ = − − +  (2.5) 
We assume 1A =  and 1ip =  and accordingly, we stop using these terms in the 
following.  
The FOCs are as follows9: 
1 1 (1 ) 0prod CR L r
CR
β β βα β α− −∂ ∏ = − + =∂  
which implies: 
 
1
1 1( ) 1
L r
CR
β
β β
β
α
−
− − = +  (2.6) 
For the purpose of simplicity we denote credit per labor as: CRcr
L
= .  Then, (2.6) 
becomes: 
 1 (1 )( )
r
cr β
β
α − = +  (2.7) 
After some manipulation of Equation (2.7) the demand for credit (in per capita terms) is: 
 
1
11
1
cr
r
ββ
α
−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠  (2.8) 
Also, given: 
                                                 
9 From now on we will not use the time indicator since we consider each variable at time t except 1td −  
which is used in bank’s problem. 
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(1 ) 0prod CR L w
L
β β βα β −∂ ∏ = − −∂ =  
one obtains: 
 ( ) (1 )cr wβα β− =  (2.9) 
Equation (2.9) implies that wages increase both with the level of credit extended to the 
producers, and with  α .  
 
Bank’s Problem: 
 
The bank determines the level of (1 )r+ and (1 )dr+ that maximizes its profit 
. Here credit and deposit are referred to as per capita values: ( bank∏ ) CRcr L=  and 
Dd
L
= . So the bank’s aim is to maximize its profit with respect to each producer ( )bankπ . 
we write the objective function as: When 
    Maximize
d(1+r ),(1+r)
1(1 ) (1 )bank d tr cr r dπ α −= + − +  (3.1) 
      subject to 1tcr d −≤  (3.2) 
 
From equation (1.9) we know that consumers have inelastic supply of deposits. 
Since there are no investment alternatives for consumers, the only thing they can do is to 
keep their savings in bank regardless of the rate of return. This means that consumers 
will accept any interest rate on their deposits if it is more than or equal to 0. Hence, it is 
optimal for banks to set . 0dr =
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In order to determine the credit interest, (1 )r+ , bank uses equation(2.8), per 
capita credit demand of producers.  
When we insert (2.8) in the equation (3.1) and take (3.2) as equality we obtain: 
 
1 1
11 1(1 )
1 1bank
r
r r
1β ββ βπ α α α
− −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  (3.3) 
which is simplified as: 
 
1
1
1 ((1 ) 1)
1bank
r
r
ββπ α
−
⎛ ⎞ α= + −⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠  (3.4) 
Here we have to make additional assumption so that we have non-negative profit 
function10: 
 (1 ) 1r α+ ≥  (3.5) 
Then FOC of this problem is: 
 
1
1-
2
1
( (1 ) 1) 0
(1 )
( 1)(1 )
bank r
r
r
β
β
β
π β βα
α β
−
−
∂ + −= =∂ + − +
 (3.6) 
 
Accordingly; 
 1(1 )r βα+ =  (3.7) 
Given interest rate (3.7) corresponding credit demand will be: 
 
1
2 1( )supply demandcr cr
β ββ α −= =  (3.8) 
                                                 
10 For concavity of the function we must have 
13 2
11
2
(1 ) ( 2 (1 ))
0
( 1)
r r
β ββ β β βα
β α
− −−+ − + + ≤−
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
which implies 1β ≤ .  
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Profit per producer will be: 
 
1
2 11( 1)( )bank
β βπ β αβ
−= −  (3.9) 
From these results we see that when α  increases, the interest rate imposed on producers 
will be lower leading to increase in the credit demand. Accordingly, we can say that the 
greater the RS, the more credit will be demanded by the firms. We next turn to the case 
of non-homogenous producers.  
 
III.3.2 Non-Homogenous Producers 
 
In this setting we have heterogeneous producers denoted by , where  is 
between 0 and 1 to indicate proportions of credit that is put into investment. In this 
setting, we have the same consumer’s problem except the consumer budget
ip ip
11, but we 
have to modify the producer’s and bank’s problem. So, for the consumer’s problem one 
can go back to the equations (1.1) through(1.9).  
 
Producer’s Problem: 
 
In this setting since producers (i=1 to n) are heterogeneous they will demand 
different levels of credit and labor as they will also pay different levels of interest. 
Hence the problem of producer i becomes: 
 
CR,L
Maximize       (4.1) 1, ( ) (1 )(prod i i i i i i i ip CR L wL r p CR
β βα α−∏ = − − + )
                                                 
)r )r11 Now we will use the budget  instead of ( (  ( (1 )t -1 i t-1w p cα+ − 1 )t -1 t-1w cα+ −
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Here we have  values that are uniformly distributed over the interval [0,1] ip
The FOCs of the producer’s problem are the following: 
 
, 1 1( ) (1 )prod i i i i i
i
p CR L p
CR
β β βα β α− −∂ ∏ 0= + − =∂  
which is solved for  cr  as: 
 11 ( ) (1 )( ) ii
cr r
p
β
β i
β
α
−
− = +  (4.2) 
Accordingly, producer i’s demand for per capita credit is : 
 
1
1
1
1i i
cr
p r
ββ
α
−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
 (4.3) 
Also, 
, ( ) (1 )prod i ip CR L wL
β β βα β −∂ ∏ 0= − −∂ =  
when simplified using CRcr
L
= yields: 
 ( ) (1 )i ip cr w
βα β− =  (4.4) 
From equation (4.4) it can be seen that, as different from the earlier solution, 
wages also increase in . ip
 
Bank’s Problem: 
 
Bank will again determine the level of (1 )r+ and (1 )dr+  that will maximize the 
bank’s profit. But now, facing the potential moral hazard problem, bank has two options: 
to monitor the producers and give individualized interest rates and credit or, not to 
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monitor them and give uniform interest rates and credit. These cases will be considered 
in subsections III.3.2.1 and III.3.2.2 respectively. 
 
III.3.2.1 Monitoring 
 
In this case, bank may monitor producers and gives individualized interest rates. 
This option will be analyzed with respect to two alternatives: when the monitoring costs 
are fixed and when they are variable. 
 
i) Variable Monitoring Cost: 
 
Bank has a monitoring cost of ( )γ α  per unit of per capita credit given to the 
producer. ( )γ α  is a negative function of α  so that when α  increases monitoring costs 
decrease. In this case, profit maximization problem of the bank will be: 
   1Maximize     (1 ) (1 ( ))
d i
bank i i i d t(1+r ),(1+r )
r p cr r dπ α γ α −= + − + +  (5.1) 
       1    i tsubject to cr d −≤  (5.2)
From equation (1.9), we know that consumers have inelastic supply of deposits 
and thus,   is zero. In order to determine (1dr )ir+  for each producer, we write  in 
terms of  from equation (4.3), and use the constraint in equation (5.2). From the 
first order conditions the profit maximizing level of interest rate is found to be:  
icr
(1 )ir+
 1 ( )(1 )i
i
r
p
γ α
βα
++ =  (5.3) 
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Then from the equation (4.2) the optimal level of credit will be (given the interest rate by 
banks): 
 
1
2 1( )
1 ( )
i
i
pcr
β ββ α
γ α
−⎛= ⎜ +⎝ ⎠
⎞⎟  (5.4) 
ii) Fixed Monitoring Cost: 
 
In this setting, monitoring cost ( ( )ψ α ) is a fixed amount per producer (but still a 
negative function ofα ), then corresponding optimization problem will be: 
        Maximize
d i(1+r ),(1+r )
1(1 ) (1 ) ( )bank i i i d tr p cr r dπ α − ψ α= + − + −  (5.5) 
     1    i tsubject to cr d −≤  (5.6) 
Similar to the case of homogenous producers, the optimal level of interest rate will be: 
 1(1 )i
i
r
pβα+ =  (5.7) 
Following the steps in the earlier case (i), optimal level of credit is found to be: 
 
1
2 1(i icr p
β β ) ββ α −=  (5.8) 
 
III.3.2.2 No Monitoring 
 
In this case, bank gives a uniform interest rate and credit to each producer, where 
expected type of the producer is the mean of the distribution, that is  assuming 
that producer types are uniformly distributed on [0,1] the expected  will be 0.5.  
ip = 0.5
ip
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When  α  is too low leading to high monitoring cost, bank may choose to give 
the same interest rate to each producer since it is too costly to determine the type of each 
consumer. In this case, the interest rate will be the rate that maximizes the following 
profit  function: 
      Maximize
d i(1+r ),(1+r )
1(1 ) (1 )bank i i i d tr p cr r dπ α −= + − +  (5.9) 
   1    i tsubject to cr d −≤  (5.10) 
As before 1 1.  dr+ =
 
In this profit function we do not have the monitoring cost. When we write  
with respect to (1  from the equation  (4.2) and the FOC is: 
icr
)ir+
 2(1 )r βα+ =  (5.11) 
From equation  (4.3) the optimal level of credit (given the interest in(5.11)) will be: 
 
2
1 1( )
2
cr
β
β βαβ − −=  (5.12) 
 
III.4 Profit Calculation 
 
Now, we consider the conditions under which conditions monitoring is more 
profitable for the bank. In order to examine this, we will calculate the profit of the bank 
in cases of fixed monitoring cost, variable monitoring cost and no monitoring cost 
respectively in subsections III.4.1, III.4.2 and III.4.3. 
 
 35
  
III.4.1 Fixed Monitoring Cost 
 
If the bank has fixed monitoring cost per producer monitored, inserting the 
optimal level of credit and interest (Equations (5.7) and (5.8)) , in equation (5.5), the 
level of profit per producer is found as: 
1 2
2 1 1 11( )( ( ) ) ( ) (bank i i i
i
p p p
p
β
β β β β )π β α α β α ψ αβα
− − −= − −  
which can be  simplified as: 
 
1
2 11( 1)( ( ) ) (bank ip
β β )π β α ψ αβ
−= − −  (6.1) 
Hence bank’s profit only depends on α  and β .  
If we write the total profit function of the bank: 
 
( )bank i ip d
β ββ α ψ αβ
11
2 1−
0
⎛ ⎞1∏ = ( −1)( ( ) ) −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ p  
If we solve for the integral, corresponding total profit will be: 
 ( )bank
β ββ α β ψβ
1
2 1−1∏ = ( −1)( ) (1− ) − α  (6.2) 
III.4.2 Variable Monitoring Cost 
 
If the bank has variable monitoring cost per unit of credit borrowed, inserting 
equations (5.3) and (5.4), in equation (5.1)  we find the corresponding profit level per 
producer as: 
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1 1
1 1
2 2( ) ( )1 ( ) (1 ( ))
1 ( ) 1 ( )
i i
bank i
i
p pp
p
β ββ ββ α β αγ απ α γ αβα γ α γ α
− −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+= − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 
which is simplified as: 
 
1
2 1( )1( 1)
(1 ( ))
i
bank
p β β
β
β απ β γ α
−⎛ ⎞= − ⎜ +⎝ ⎠⎟
 (6.3) 
If we write the total profit function of the bank: 
i
bank i
p dp
β β
β
β α
β γ α
1
1 2 1−
0
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞( )1⎜ ⎟∏ = ( −1)⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟(1+ ( ))⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∫  
If we solve for the integral, corresponding total profit will be: 
 bank
β β
β
β α ββ γ α
1
2 1−⎛ ⎞1∏ = ( −1) (1− )⎜ ⎟(1+ ( ))⎝ ⎠
 (6.4) 
 
III.4.3 No Monitoring 
 
Bank gives uniquely determined interest rate and credit that is determined under 
the assumption that the expected  (ip )eip  is equal to 0.5. Accordingly, the credit interest 
and credit supply are 2(1 )r βα+ =  and 
2
1 1( )
2supply
cr
β
β βαβ − −=  respectively. 
If we calculate the optimal levels of credit for the producers (credit demand 
denoted by ) for  and  and compare this with  demandcr 0.5ip < 0.5ip > supplycr  : 
 37
  
 
1
2 1
1 1
1
1
( )
2 2
2
supplycr
β β
β β
β
α ββ
α
βα
−
− −
−
= =
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (6.5) 
 
( )
( )
1
2 1
, 1
1
1
2
demand i
i
cr
p
β β
β
β α −
−
=  (6.6) 
Accordingly: 
For , 0.5ip > demand supplycr cr<  
For  ,  0.5ip < demand supplycr cr>
so that the agents with  will not use the credit for production since given credit 
is not enough to obtain the optimal level of profit which is indeed zero in case of perfect 
competition. This means that producers, who would incur negative profit when they 
transform all of the credit into production, naturally choose not to use this credit for 
production and they rather consume it. Conversely producers with  will use only 
the optimal amount of credit for production and consume the rest.  Hence, both groups’ 
optimal behavior exhibits moral hazard.  
0.5ip <
0.5ip >
 Along with the explanation above, profit function of the bank in non-monitoring 
case will be: 
bank i i i ip p p
β β
β β β βα β α β ααβ
2 21
1− 1− 1− 1−
0.5
⎛ ⎞2∏ = ( ) − ( )⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ dp  
 
Then: 
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1 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 11-= 2 (1- 2 ) (1 )(1 2 )
2bank
β β β β 1
β β β β ββ β α β α ββ
+ −
− − − − − −⎛ ⎞∏ −⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
β
−
− −  
In a more simplified version: 
 =bank
β β β
β β β ββ β α ββ
1+ −2 −1
1− 1− 1− 1−⎡ ⎤2∏ (1− ) (1− 2 ) − (1− 2 )⎢ ⎥2 −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (6.7) 
 
III.5 Bank’s Decision Process 
 
In this section we will compare the profits for each case of monitoring calculated 
in section III.412.   The following profit functions (6.8), (6.9) and (6.10) correspond to 
the fixed-cost, variable-cost and no monitoring cases, respectively: 
Fixed-cost monitoring (from equation (6.2)):   
 ( ) 12 11= ( 1) (1 ) ( )bank β ββ α β ψβ −∏ − − − α  (6.8) 
Variable-cost monitoring (from equation (6.4)):   
  
 
1
2 11= ( 1)(1 )
(1 ( ))bank
β β
β
β αββ γ α
−⎛∏ − − ⎜ +⎝ ⎠
⎞⎟  (6.9) 
 
 
No monitoring (from equation (6.7)):   
 =bank
β β β
β β β ββ β α ββ
1+ −2 −1
1− 1− 1− 1−⎡ ⎤2∏ (1− ) (1− 2 ) − (1− 2 )⎢ ⎥2 −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (6.10) 
                                                 
12 Here we have two terms indicating different kinds of monitoring costs. ( )θ α  is used for fixed 
monitoring cost and ( )γ α  is used for variable monitoring cost. 
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In the following, we will simulate each of these profit functions using some reasonable 
values of α  and β ,  and assuming appropriate fixed and variable cost functions. Fixed 
monitoring cost ( ( )ψ α ) is assumed to be fixed proportion ( ( )θ α ) of expected per capita 
income and variable monitoring cost is assumed to be a negative function of α . 
Accordingly, cost functions are given as: ( ) ( ) Y
L
ψ α θ α
−
=  and 1( ) ( )θ α γ α α= = . 
13 For 
α , we take the range between 0 and 1.  
   
III.5.1 Fixed Cost versus Variable Cost 
 
We have the following relationship between ( )θ α  and ( )γ α if we equalize 
profits for fixed and variable monitoring costs in equations (6.8) and (6.9):  
( ) 1 12 11 1( 1)(1 ) 1 ( )1 ( ) YL
β
ββ ββ β α θ αβ γ α
−
−
−
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟− − − =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
Provided that the following condition holds (ie. equation (6.8) - (6.9)  ): 0≥
 ( ) 1 12 11 1( 1)(1 ) 1 ( )1 ( ) YL
β
ββ ββ β α θ αβ γ α
−
−
−
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟− − − − ≥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
0  (6.11) 
bank’s profit in case of fixed monitoring cost will be greater than the profit in case of 
variable monitoring cost. Simulation analysis reported in the Appendix reveals that this 
condition is never met for β < 0.5  that are indeed suggested by Mankiw et al. (1992) to 
                                                 
13 Considering expected per capita income as ( ) (i iY p pL
ββ β β βα β α2 1−
−
= )  corresponding fixed monitoring 
cost becomes ( )
2 1 2
1 1 1
ip
β β β
β β βψ α α β
−
− − −=  
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be the feasible values for β 14.  This indicates that incurring variable monitoring cost is 
always preferred by profit maximizing banks.  
 
III.5.2 Fixed Cost versus No Monitoring 
 
The following is the condition under which bank profits under fixed monitoring cost is 
higher than those under no monitoring (ie. equation (6.8) - (6.10)  ) 0≥
( ) Y
L
β β β
β β β ββ β α β β θ αβ
−1+ −2 −1
1− 1− 1− 1−⎡ ⎤2(1− ) (1− ) − (1− 2 ) + (1− 2 ) − ≥ 0⎢ ⎥2 −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
If we simplify this inequality further, we find the following relationship between  α  and 
β : 
 
( ) Y
L
β β
β β
β
β
θ α
β β β ββ
β
α
−
1+ −2 −1
1− 1− 1−
1−
⎡ ⎤2≤ (1− ) (1− ) − (1− 2 ) + (1− 2 )⎢ ⎥2 −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (6.12) 
 
Simulation analysis in Appendix shows that that this condition is never met for 
the feasible β  values .  This means that monitoring producers with fixed monitoring 
cost is never profitable for the bank as compared to not monitoring them.   
 
 
III.5.3 Variable Cost versus No Monitoring 
 
If we examine the condition under which monitoring with variable cost is more 
profitable for the bank we find (ie. equation (6.9)-(6.10) ): 0≥
                                                 
14 For US, for example, Mankiw et al. (1992) show that β=1/3. 
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β β β
β β β β
β
β
ββ β α ββγ α
1+ −2 −1
1− 1− 1− 1−
1−
⎡ ⎤(1− ) 2⎢ ⎥(1− ) − (1− 2 ) + (1− 2 ) ≥ 0⎢ ⎥2 −⎢ ⎥(1+ ( ))⎣ ⎦
 
Accordingly, 
 
β
β β
β
β
β ββγ α
−2 −1
1− 1−
1−
⎡ ⎤(1− ) 2⎢ ⎥− (1− 2 ) + (1− 2 ) ≥ 0⎢ ⎥2 −⎢ ⎥(1+ ( ))⎣ ⎦
 (6.13) 
 
 
Together with subsection III.5.2, we can say that variable monitoring producers 
and giving them individualized interest rates is less profitable for the bank as compared 
to giving a unique interest rate without monitoring. The reason might be the fact that 
when costs are too high then profit maximizing bank will choose not to monitor 
producers.    
 
Based on these results, the following propositions arise: 
 
Proposition 1:   For banks: no monitoring ? variable-cost monitoring  fixed-cost 
monitoring
?
15
 
Proposition 2:   The smaller the β  (income share of capital), the more preferable it is 
by the banks to choose variable cost monitoring over no monitoring.   
 
 
 
                                                 
15 “ ” means “preferred to” ?
 42
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
COMPARATIVE STATIC ANALYSIS 
 
 
The following demonstrates how optimal levels of interest rates, per capita 
credits, per capita production; per capita deposits, and wage rates are affected from the 
α .  
 
IV.1 Interest rates 
 
 When producers are homogenous, from equation (3.7) : 
 2 0
r
α βα
∂(1+ ) −1= <∂  (7.1) 
This result indicates that interest rate decreases in case of an increase in α  level. 
Since banks penalize producers because of their inefficient credit conversion ratios, then 
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if this inefficiency decreases by an increase in RS level, they will penalize producers less 
by imposing less interest rate.  
In case of non homogenous producers and variable monitoring cost from 
equation (5.3):  
 2
( ) ( ( )) 0
i i
r
p p
γ α γ α
α α βα βα
⎡ ⎤∂(1+ ) ∂ 1 1+= ⋅ − <⎢∂ ∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎥  (7.2) 
 2
( ( )) 0
i i
r
p p
γ α
βα
⎡ ⎤∂(1+ ) − 1+= <⎢∂ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎥  (7.3) 
 > 0
( ) i
r
pγ α βα
∂(1+ ) 1=∂  (7.4) 
 
 
Interest rate also decreases with respect to both α  and . This indicates that if 
 level increases, then the interest rate imposed on this producer is smaller.  This also 
implies that interest rate increases as the cost of monitoring goes up. 
ip
ip
 
In case of non homogenous producers and fixed monitoring cost from equation 
(5.7) : 
 2
1 0
i
r
pα βα
∂(1+ ) −= <∂  (7.5) 
 2
1 0
i i
r
p pβα
∂(1+ ) −= <∂  (7.6) 
 
Accordingly, we have the same conclusion with the variable monitoring cost 
case with respect to α  and  levels. ip
 44
  
IV.2 Per Capita Credit 
 
When we have homogenous producers, producers then from equation (3.8),  
 > 0cr
β β
β ββ α
α β
3− 2 −1
1− 1−⎡ ⎤∂ ⎢= ⎢∂ (1− )⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎥⎥  (7.7) 
This indicates that when the regulation and supervision level of banks increases, 
then banks will prefer to give more credit since they use this credit more efficiently. 
When we have non homogenous producers with variable monitoring costs, then 
from equation (5.4): 
 
2
2
( ( )) ( ( ))( ( ))
( ( ))
i
i
p p
cr
β β β β β ββ β β ββ β β β
β
β α γ α γ αγ α β αβ α β
α γ α
3− 2 −1
11− 1− 1− 1−
1− 1− 1− 1−
1−
∂ 1+ 1+⋅ 1+ − ⋅∂ (1− ) ∂ (1− )=∂ 1+
 
 
When we simplify this: 
 
 2
( ( )) ( ( ))( ( ))
( ( ))
ip
cr
β β β
β β β β
β
β α γ α γ αβ γ α αβ α
α γ α
2 2 −1
1− 1− 1− 1−
1−
⎛ ⎞1+ ∂ 1+⎜ ⎟ ⎛ ⎞⋅ 1+ −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟(1− ) ∂⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠=∂ 1+
 (7.8) 
 
 > 0
( ( ))
i
i
pcr
p
β β β
β β ββ α
β γ α
3− 2 −1
1− 1− 1−⎡ ⎤∂ ⎢= ⎢∂ (1− ) 1+⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎥⎥  (7.9) 
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Since we have presumed that ( ( ))γ α1+  decreases with an increase inα , then 
equation (7.8) gives positive results indicating that credit given to the producers will 
increase when α  increases. (7.9) shows that when the quality of the producer increases, 
more credit will be extended to the producer by the bank. 
 When producers are non homogenous and banks have fixed monitoring costs, 
from equation (5.8),  
 > 0ipcr
β β β
β β ββ α
α β
3− 2 −1
1− 1− 1−⎡ ⎤∂ ⎢= ⎢∂ (1− )⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎥⎥  (7.10) 
 
 > 0i
i
pcr
p
β β β
β β ββ α
β
3− 2 −1
1− 1− 1−⎡ ⎤∂ ⎢= ⎢∂ (1− )⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎥⎥  (7.11) 
 
This indicates that in addition to RS level, when quality of the producer 
increases, bank will extend more credit to the producer. 
 
IV.3 Per Capita Production 
 
In case of homogenous producers, if we write per capita production function with 
respect to per capita credit amount we will have: 
 
1-( )Y CR L
L L
β βα=  (7.12) 
 
Accordingly, 
 y crβ βα=  (7.13) 
 
Then, 
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 1y crcr crβ β β ββα αα α
1− −∂ ∂⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥∂ ∂⎣ ⎦  (7.14) 
 
 
Since we have already shown that  0crα
∂ >∂ , the equation (7.14) gives positive results. 
This indicates that the higher the RS level, the greater production will be. 
In case of non homogenous producers, we will have the per capita production 
function equal to: 
 iy p cr
ββ βα=  (7.15) 
 
Then, 
 1 i i
y crp cr p crβ ββ β β ββα αα α
1− −∂ ∂⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥∂ ∂⎣ ⎦  (7.16) 
 
 1 1i i
i i
y crp cr p cr
p p
β ββ β β ββα α− −⎡ ⎤∂ ∂= +⎢ ⎥∂ ∂⎣ ⎦  (7.17) 
 
Since we have already shown:  0crα
∂ >∂   and   0i
cr
p
∂ >∂ , then equation (7.16) and (7.17) 
will be directly positive. Equation  (7.16) indicates that as α  level increases, per capita 
production will also increase. Equation (7.17) implies that producers with higher quality 
will produce more in per capita terms.   
 
IV.4 Wage Rate 
 
In case of homogenous producers, we have: 
 1(1- )w crcr cr 1β β ββ β α αα α
−∂ ∂ β−⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥∂ ∂⎣ ⎦  (7.18) 
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Since we know 0crα
∂ >∂ , equation (7.18) is directly positive, indicating that when α  
increases, wage rate also goes up. 
In case of non homogenous producers, from equation (4.4): 
 1(1- ) i
w cp cr crβ β β β ββ β α αα α
− −1r⎡ ⎤∂ ∂⎛= +⎜ ⎞⎟⎢ ⎥∂ ∂⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦  (7.19) 
 
 1 1(1- ) i
i i
w cp cr cr p
p p
ββ β ββ βα − − ir β
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞∂ ∂= +⎢ ⎥⎜∂ ∂ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 (7.20) 
 
Since we already know 0crα
∂ >∂  and 0i
cr
p
∂ >∂ equations (7.19) and (7.20) will 
give positive derivatives indicating that wages will increase with respect to RS level and 
producer quality.  
From above analysis the following propositions arise: 
Proposition 3: Higher bank regulation and supervision improves per capita 
output, wages and credit and reduces interest rates. 
Proposition 4: Producers with higher ip  levels have higher per capita output; 
they pay higher wages; they demand more credit and pay less interest rate. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This is the first study that examines theoretically the effect of bank regulation 
and supervision (RS) on economic growth. In this study, we analyze the effect of RS 
using 2-period OLG model. We construct our model such that RS is assumed to affect 
the producer’s behavior in terms of converting credit into investment; consumer’s 
behavior in terms of converting savings into deposit; and bank’s behavior in terms of 
monitoring borrowers. Starting with these assumptions we have dealt with two different 
scenarios: homogenous and non-homogenous producers with regards to moral hazard 
rates.  
 
From the optimization problems of agents (consumers, producers and banks) we 
have found out that RS positively affects the economy from different aspects: Firstly, it 
increases the available capital and accordingly the production level by raising the 
proportion of the credit that is converted into capital, secondly, it increases wage rate as 
 49
  
 
In this study we have assumed that RS is exogenous. In further studies, the levels 
of RS will be determined within the system.  This will give us the opportunity to explore 
the policy implications since it gives government the option to choose the optimal RS, 
which will maximize the social welfare.   
50
)dr
In addition to this, in the producer’s problem we have used logarithmic utility 
function leading to inelastic supply of deposits. However, with a CES (constant 
elasticity of substitution) utility function, we would have elastic supply of deposits 
depending on the interest rate (1+ so that we would not have (1  equal to 1. 
Another issue that might be considered is the depreciation rate. Setting depreciation rate 
less that 100% will also improve the adequacy of our model.       
a result of increase in production,  and lastly, it affects the tendency of banks to monitor 
the producers. On the latter, we have used calibration technique in order to consider 
possible decisions of the bank. We assumed an arbitrary form of monitoring cost that is 
a negative function of RS. Using this function, we have found that not monitoring the 
producers is more profitable for the bank than monitoring them. 
 
 
)dr+
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APPENDIX 
Simulation of the Optimal Profits under 3 types of Monitoring Regimes 
 
Alpha
NM FM VM FM-NM VM-NM FM-VM NM FM VM FM-NM VM-NM FM-VM NM FM VM FM-NM VM-NM FM-VM NM FM VM FM-NM VM-NM FM-VM NM FM VM FM-NM VM-NM FM-VM
0.050 0.005 -0.259 0.000 -0.263 -0.004 -0.259 0.007 -0.494 0.001 -0.490 -0.007 -0.495 0.011 -0.871 0.002 -0.883 -0.009 -0.873 0.016 -1.446 0.004 -1.462 -0.012 -1.450 0.021 -2.293 0.007 -2.314 -0.014 -2.301
0.10 0.008 -0.223 0.001 -0.231 -0.007 -0.224 0.012 -0.385 0.002 -0.378 -0.010 -0.387 0.016 -0.622 0.004 -0.639 -0.013 -0.626 0.021 -0.959 0.007 -0.980 -0.014 -0.966 0.026 -1.427 0.012 -1.454 -0.015 -1.439
0.15 0.011 -0.203 0.001 -0.214 -0.010 -0.204 0.016 -0.329 0.003 -0.320 -0.012 -0.333 0.020 -0.507 0.006 -0.528 -0.015 -0.513 0.026 -0.750 0.010 -0.775 -0.016 -0.759 0.030 -1.076 0.015 -1.106 -0.015 -1.091
0.20 0.014 -0.188 0.002 -0.202 -0.012 -0.190 0.019 -0.293 0.004 -0.281 -0.014 -0.298 0.024 -0.436 0.008 -0.460 -0.016 -0.444 0.029 -0.627 0.012 -0.655 -0.017 -0.639 0.033 -0.877 0.018 -0.911 -0.015 -0.895
0.25 0.017 -0.176 0.003 -0.193 -0.014 -0.179 0.022 -0.267 0.006 -0.253 -0.016 -0.272 0.027 -0.387 0.010 -0.414 -0.017 -0.396 0.032 -0.543 0.015 -0.575 -0.017 -0.558 0.036 -0.747 0.021 -0.783 -0.015 -0.767
0.30 0.020 -0.166 0.004 -0.186 -0.015 -0.170 0.025 -0.246 0.007 -0.230 -0.018 -0.253 0.030 -0.349 0.011 -0.379 -0.018 -0.360 0.034 -0.482 0.017 -0.516 -0.018 -0.499 0.038 -0.653 0.023 -0.691 -0.015 -0.676
0.35 0.022 -0.157 0.005 -0.180 -0.017 -0.163 0.027 -0.228 0.009 -0.211 -0.019 -0.237 0.032 -0.319 0.013 -0.351 -0.019 -0.332 0.037 -0.435 0.019 -0.471 -0.018 -0.453 0.040 -0.582 0.025 -0.622 -0.015 -0.607
0.40 0.025 -0.150 0.006 -0.175 -0.019 -0.156 0.030 -0.214 0.010 -0.195 -0.020 -0.224 0.035 -0.294 0.015 -0.329 -0.020 -0.309 0.039 -0.396 0.021 -0.435 -0.018 -0.417 0.042 -0.525 0.027 -0.567 -0.015 -0.552
0.45 0.027 -0.143 0.007 -0.170 -0.020 -0.150 0.032 -0.201 0.011 -0.181 -0.021 -0.212 0.037 -0.274 0.017 -0.311 -0.020 -0.290 0.041 -0.365 0.023 -0.406 -0.018 -0.387 0.044 -0.479 0.029 -0.523 -0.015 -0.508
0.50 0.030 -0.136 0.009 -0.166 -0.021 -0.145 0.035 -0.189 0.013 -0.168 -0.022 -0.202 0.039 -0.256 0.018 -0.295 -0.021 -0.274 0.043 -0.338 0.024 -0.381 -0.018 -0.362 0.045 -0.441 0.031 -0.486 -0.014 -0.472
0.55 0.032 -0.130 0.010 -0.162 -0.023 -0.140 0.037 -0.179 0.014 -0.157 -0.023 -0.193 0.041 -0.240 0.020 -0.281 -0.021 -0.259 0.045 -0.315 0.026 -0.359 -0.019 -0.341 0.047 -0.408 0.032 -0.455 -0.014 -0.441
0.60 0.035 -0.124 0.011 -0.159 -0.024 -0.135 0.039 -0.170 0.016 -0.146 -0.024 -0.186 0.043 -0.226 0.021 -0.269 -0.022 -0.247 0.046 -0.294 0.028 -0.341 -0.019 -0.322 0.048 -0.380 0.034 -0.428 -0.014 -0.414
0.65 0.037 -0.119 0.012 -0.156 -0.025 -0.131 0.041 -0.161 0.017 -0.136 -0.024 -0.178 0.045 -0.213 0.023 -0.258 -0.022 -0.236 0.048 -0.276 0.029 -0.324 -0.019 -0.306 0.049 -0.355 0.035 -0.405 -0.014 -0.391
0.70 0.039 -0.114 0.013 -0.153 -0.026 -0.127 0.043 -0.153 0.019 -0.127 -0.025 -0.172 0.047 -0.201 0.024 -0.248 -0.022 -0.226 0.049 -0.260 0.031 -0.310 -0.019 -0.291 0.051 -0.333 0.037 -0.384 -0.014 -0.370
0.75 0.042 -0.109 0.015 -0.150 -0.027 -0.123 0.045 -0.146 0.020 -0.119 -0.026 -0.166 0.049 -0.191 0.026 -0.240 -0.023 -0.217 0.051 -0.246 0.032 -0.297 -0.019 -0.278 0.052 -0.314 0.038 -0.366 -0.014 -0.352
0.80 0.044 -0.104 0.016 -0.148 -0.028 -0.120 0.047 -0.139 0.021 -0.111 -0.026 -0.160 0.050 -0.181 0.027 -0.232 -0.023 -0.209 0.052 -0.233 0.034 -0.285 -0.019 -0.266 0.053 -0.296 0.040 -0.349 -0.013 -0.336
0.85 0.046 -0.099 0.017 -0.146 -0.029 -0.117 0.049 -0.133 0.023 -0.104 -0.027 -0.155 0.052 -0.172 0.029 -0.224 -0.023 -0.201 0.054 -0.221 0.035 -0.274 -0.019 -0.256 0.054 -0.281 0.041 -0.334 -0.013 -0.321
0.90 0.048 -0.095 0.018 -0.143 -0.030 -0.113 0.051 -0.126 0.024 -0.096 -0.027 -0.150 0.054 -0.164 0.030 -0.218 -0.024 -0.194 0.055 -0.210 0.036 -0.265 -0.019 -0.246 0.055 -0.266 0.042 -0.321 -0.013 -0.308
0.95 0.050 -0.091 0.020 -0.141 -0.031 -0.110 0.053 -0.121 0.025 -0.090 -0.028 -0.146 0.055 -0.156 0.032 -0.211 -0.024 -0.188 0.056 -0.199 0.038 -0.256 -0.019 -0.237 0.056 -0.253 0.043 -0.309 -0.013 -0.296
1.00 0.053 -0.087 0.021 -0.139 -0.032 -0.107 0.055 -0.115 0.027 -0.083 -0.028 -0.142 0.057 -0.149 0.033 -0.206 -0.024 -0.182 0.058 -0.190 0.039 -0.247 -0.019 -0.229 0.057 -0.241 0.044 -0.298 -0.013 -0.285
Beta=0.35 Beta=0.30 Beta=0.25Beta=0.45 Beta=0.40
 
Table2: Simulation of the profit functions under fixed cost and variable cost monitoring and no-monitoring (equations  (6.8), (6.9) and (6.10)) for 
α0 ≤ ≤ 1  and 0.5β <  
  
  
 
Note: NM indicates no monitoring, FM indicates fixed-cost monitoring, VM indicates variable cost monitoring 
  
Figures 1 to 15 below are based on Table 2. 
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    Figure 1: FM-NM for 0.45β =  
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   Figure 2: VM-NM for 0.45β =  
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   Figure 3: FM-VM for 0.45β =  
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    Figure 4: FM-NM for 0.4β =  
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  Figure 5: VM-NM for 0.4β =  
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   Figure 6: FM-VM for 0.4β =  
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  Figure 7: FM-NM for 0.35β =  
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   Figure 8: VM-NM for 0.35β =  
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  Figure 9: FM-VM for 0.35β =  
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  Figure 10: FM-NM for 0.3β =  
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Figure 11: VM-NM for 0.3β =  
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  Figure 12: FM-VM for 0.3β =  
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  Figure 13: FM-NM for 0.25β =  
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   Figure 14: VM-NM for 0.25β =  
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Figure 15: FM-VM for 0.25β =  
 
These figures show that fixed-cost monitoring is always less preferable as 
compared to no monitoring and variable cost monitoring. Comparing no monitoring 
versus variable-cost monitoring, we see that no monitoring is more profitable for the 
bank. However, we also see that this difference diminishes as β  falls and α  increase. 
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